Centrone, Stefania. Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl. Cobb-Stevens, Richard. Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. Cortois, Paul. A global picture of Husserl's architectonic view of the structure of formal science including formal mathematics is offered, as the view got its fullest yet elliptic articulation in the first three chapters of Formale und transzendentale Logik It is shown how Husserl's understanding of the structure of formal science abstracting from the latter's subjective foundation requires the independent consideration of at least three dimensions with respect to the formal, in terms, respectively, of 'approaches', epistemic 'interests', and 'successive layers'.
First, there is the dimension of apophantic versus ontological approaches; second, the distinction of combinatorial syntactic versus truth semantic interest; and third, the consideration of the three layers of pure grammar, derivability relations, and systems or manifold theory. Crosson, Frederick James. Cunningham, Suzanne. Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl. This paper presents and discusses Husserl's conception of logic, formal logic in particular.
A special emphasis is giving to Husserl's idea of a theory of manifolds as the closure of the thematic field of formal logic. Husserl's own version of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics is also presented and some aspects of his conception of formal logic are highlighted and contrasted with Frege's. In this paper I discuss Husserl's solution of the problem of imaginary elements in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures he gave in Gottingen in and other related texts of the same period, a problem that had occupied Husserl since the beginning of , when he was planning a never published sequel to "Philosophie der Arithmetik" In order to solve the problem of imaginary entities Husserl introduced, independently of Hilbert, two notions of completeness definiteness in Husserl's terminology for a formal axiomatic system.
I present and discuss these notions here, establishing also parallels between Husserl's and Hilbert's notions of completeness. Dahlstrom, Daniel O. Husserl's Logical Investigations. De Oliveira, Nythamar Fernandes. This article seeks to show that, although emerging out of a so-called traditional, metaphysical view of language, Edmund Husserl's theory of meaning qua ideal species in the "Logical Investigations" cannot be reduced to the linguistic expression of an essentialist, representational adequation, but rather emphasizes the role of intentionality, the ideality of language, and the constitutive character of consciousness in the fulfillment of "meaning" "Bedeutung".
Dougherty, Charles J. The purpose of this paper is to explore Husserl's critique of psychologism and his positive theory of mind against both its historical background and the developments that issued from it. The conclusion of the paper is the claim that Husserl's rejection of psychologism led him to ground logic in a realm of ideal relationships made available by way of a new method of non-reductive analysis, phenomenology.
Phenomenological analysis itself is shown to be a methodological expression of a theory of mind as an active participant in the constitution of reality. Dreyfus, Hubert L. Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. Drummond, John J.
Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy. Lanham: Scarecrow Press. Ducat, Philippe. Dufourcq, Annabelle. Dordrecht: Springer. It is stated that Husserl's theory of truth is ambiguous. Purely logical relations in an eternal order of truth, independent of things, seems to conflict with the idea of evidence, which is a psychological experience. It is concluded that truth is the result of an intuition in which the thing itself is given.
Finally, parallels are drawn between Husserl's double truth and Leibniz's truths of reason and truths of fact. Edie, James M. Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology. A Critical Commentary. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Eley, Lothar. Metatrik Der Formalen Logik. Elliston, Frederick A.
Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Elveton, Roy O. The Phenomenology of Husserl. Selected Critical Readings. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. English, Jacques. Farber, Marvin. The Foundations of Phenomenology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Fine, Kit. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fink, Eugen. Sixth Cartesian Meditation. The Idea of a Transcendental Method. Boomington: Indian University Press. Fisette, Denis. Husserl's Logical Investigations Reconsidered. Fisette, Denis, and Lapointe, Sandra, eds. Flores, Luis.
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An object, for Husserl, is anything toward which an act can be directed. Not all objects are material; there are also immaterial objects, for example, numbers and the other ideal objects of mathematics. Mathematics and all natural sciences, including psychology, are sciences about the objects of our acts. But we have just noticed that in addition to possibly having an object, every act also has a noema. And what Husserl wanted to create with his phenomenology was a new science, a science of noemata. Noemata are objects, too. In an act of reflection the noema of one act can be made the object of another act.
Mathematicians and scientists explore what we experience, the world of nature around us. In the phenomenological reduction we disregard this nature, this world of objects toward which our acts are directed.
We do not deny that it is there, as if we were sophists, nor do we doubt that it is there, as if we were sceptics, but we, as it were, put it in brackets. The phenomenologist does not worry about what is or is not in the real world around him. He is not disturbed by the fact that some of our acts have objects, others not, but turns to the noemata of our acts.
These are the phenomena he considers. The real world is reduced to a correlative of our acts, which constitute it, bring it forth. All that is transcendent is put in brackets together with the other objects of our acts. What is left, purified of all that is transcendent, Husserl called transcendental.
The phenomenological reduction hence leads us from the transcendent to the transcendental. The phenomenologist analyzes the noemata of his acts in order to clarify how the world is 'constituted' by his consciousness. He observes that he expects a tree to have a back, to continue to be there if he turns away from it for a moment, and so forth.
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He studies the structure of the noemata of his acts. He elucidates how his expectations are arranged in patterns, how new sense impressions can change his expectations and sometimes lead to an 'explosion' of the noemata and make him reject his original supposition about the direction of his act.
One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations Revisited
According to Husserl, phenomenology thereby becomes an analysis of something similar to what Kant called the a priori. If one were to describe phenomenology in brief, it would therefore be this: an investigation of the a priori, the necessary. Its aim is similar to that of many other philosophies from antiquity onward. But its methods, and the general framework of acts, noemata, and objects within which it tries to make sense of this aim, are different.
It is also not difficult to see the close connection between analytic philosophy and phenomenology here. For just as analytic philosophers, especially those of the so-called linguistic variety, analyze meaning, meanings of linguistic expressions, so the phenomenologist analyzes noemata, or meanings of acts in general. Reprinted in: Hunert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall eds. The problem of justifying our beliefs, giving evidence for them, is central in Husserl's phenomenology.
In his writings he comes back again and again to the notions of justification and evidence. Husserl is particularly interested in perfect evidence, of which he distinguishes two kinds: adequate evidence, which we have when all our anticipations are filled, and apodictic evidence, which we have when the negation of our judgment is self-contradictory. This emphasis on apodictic and adequate evidence, together with Husserl's concern with philosophy as a strict science and with the possibility of establishing absolutely certain and obvious first premisses, might give us the impression that Husserl was a foundationalist: he wanted to establish a firm foundation for science and philosophy of the kind that Aristotle, Descartes, and many others have been striving for.
However, in this paper I shall argue that in spite of appearances, Husserl was not a foundationalist. He was not even a foundationalist in logic and mathematics,- the classical strongholds of foundationalism; on the contrary he was close to the position that was later put forward by Nelson Goodman and some other "holists". Kluwer: Dordrecht. Original edition: Husserl und Frege. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Washington: Catholic University.
Gardies, Jean-Louis. Rational Grammar. Besides investigating the nature of grammaticality, the distinction between logic and grammar and the relation of grammatical structure to the communicative functions of language, the author analyzes a large number of grammatical phenomena names, verbs, conjunctions, adverbs, mood, tense, aspect, etc. Ginev, Dimitri. Gobber, Giovanni. Haaparanta, Leila.
This paper attempts to study the methods which Frege and Husserl followed in their logics. Frege regards the problem of discovering logical laws as a psychological problem but takes the interest in the method of discovering the logical language to belong to logic. Husserl does not intend to construct a new language but he seeks for the epistemological justification of Aristotelian logic. It is shown how Husserl proceeds in his studies of the origins of logic. It is concluded that both Frege and Husserl rely on the method of analysis but they use it for different purposes in their logical studies.
Mind, Meaning, and Mathematics. Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl and Frege. London: College Publications. Hamacher, Hermes Adelheid. Hanna, Robert. Frege's devastating attack on logical psychologism leaves philosophers of logic in a quandary: If logical propositions exist altogether independently of human acts of thinking, then "how" can they be grasped by thinkers?
Husserl's "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" contains a thorough critique of psychologism, but manages to avoid Frege's problem by developing a plausible theory of logical cognition. Husserl's account entails that a logical propositions are essentially knowable by finite rational minds, but also b those propositions are irreducible to individual human minds. Hence Husserl shows that there can be a weak form of psychologism that is perfectly consistent with anti-psychologism. Hart, James G. Lectures on Transcendental Logic. Harvey, Charles W. Heffernan, George. Bonn: Bouvier.
According to the leading commentators and the author himself, Edmund Husserl's "Formal and transcendental logic" is the most important work on phenomenological logic ever written. Nonetheless, it has, in general, gained far less attention than the "Logical investigations" and the "Ideas on a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy". In particular, the argument of section 1 of the "Logic", namely, that it is fruitful to start with the meanings of the expression "Logos" in order to develop a genuinely transcendental logic, has received virtually no consideration.
This paper takes a step towards filling this empty space by analyzing and criticizing the argument of section 1 as a problem to which a solution s must be found. Throughout, the paper reads Husserl's "descriptions" as 'arguments' for his positions, thereby avoiding any of the obscurity sometimes infecting work in continental philosophy. Am Anfang War Die Logik. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- A Bibliography of Writings.
- Of the Sublime: Presence in Question?
- BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HUSSERL'S WORKS.
- ISBN 13: 9781402007002.
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Hill, Claire Ortiz. Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell. The Roots of Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. The argument that Frege influenced Husserl 7; 2. Husserl, Frege, and psychologism 13; 3. Sense, meaning, and noema; 4. Husserl's critique of Frege 43; 5. Frege's review and the development of Husserl's thought 57; Conclusion: analyticity Introduction 99; 6.
Intensions and extensions ; 7. Presentation and ideas ; 8. Function and concept ; 9. From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic is both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism.
I. Towards a Phenomenological Critique of Naturalizing Consciousness
Prices and offers may vary in store. The work had a tremendous influence on the subsequent development of phenomenology, and it also left its mark on such diverse disciplines as linguistics, comparative literature, psychology, cognitive science, and mathematics. This volume commemorates the centenary of Logical Investigations by subjecting the work to a comprehensive critical analysis. It contains new contributions by leading scholars addressing some of the most central analyses to be found in the book.
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Hours of Play:. Tell Us Where You Are:. Preview Your Review. Thank you. Your review has been submitted and will appear here shortly. Extra Content. Table of Contents Acknowledgments. Part I: Problems of Logic. Non-Objectifying Acts; J. What is 'Logical' in Husserl's Logical Investigations?